enerbol and Wounds-and-Injuries

Peter Singer has argued that nothing done to a fetus before it acquires consciousness can harm it. At the same time, he concedes that a child can be harmed by something done to it when it was a non-conscious fetus. But this implies that the non-conscious fetus can be harmed. The mistake lies in thinking that, since existence can be instrinsically bad for a being only if it is conscious, it can be harmed only if it is conscious. In fact, its being harmed only implies that it could have been conscious (and led a good life).

Topics: Abortion, Induced; Beginning of Human Life; Brain; Embryo, Mammalian; Embryonic and Fetal Development; Ethics; Fetal Research; Fetus; Homicide; Humans; Individuality; Life; Personhood; Prenatal Exposure Delayed Effects; Quality of Life; Research; Tissue and Organ Procurement; Tissue Donors; Value of Life; Wounds and Injuries

Testing embryonic cells for genetic abnormalities gives us the capacity to predict whether and to what extent people will exist with disease and disability. Moreover, the freezing of embryos for long periods of time enables us to alter the length of a normal human lifespan. After highlighting the shortcomings of somatic-cell gene therapy and germ-line genetic alteration, I argue that the testing and selective termination of genetically defective embryos is the only medically and morally defensible way to prevent the existence of people with severe disability, pain and suffering that make their lives not worth living for them on the whole. In addition, I consider the possible harmful effects on children born from frozen embryos after the deaths of their biological parents, or when their parents are at an advanced age. I also explore whether embryos have moral status and whether the prospects for disease-preventing genetic alteration can justify long-term cryopreservation of embryos.

Topics: Age of Onset; Altruism; Beginning of Human Life; Beneficence; Child; Cryopreservation; Disabled Persons; Embryo Disposition; Embryo, Mammalian; Ethics; Eugenics; Fetal Diseases; Fetus; Genetic Diseases, Inborn; Genetic Engineering; Genetic Enhancement; Genetic Testing; Genetic Therapy; Germ Cells; Humans; Individuality; Life; Moral Obligations; Pain; Parents; Personhood; Persons with Mental Disabilities; Posthumous Conception; Preimplantation Diagnosis; Quality of Life; Reproduction; Reproductive Techniques, Assisted; Risk; Risk Assessment; Self Concept; Social Justice; Social Responsibility; Stress, Psychological; Time Factors; Value of Life; Wounds and Injuries; Wrongful Life

It has been argued that there can be no person-regarding reasons for practising genetic therapy, since it affects identity and causes to exist an individual who would not otherwise have existed. And there can be no such reasons for causing somebody to exist because existing cannot be better for an individual than never existing. In the present paper, both of these claims are denied. It is contended, first, that in practically all significant cases genetic therapy will not affect the identity of beings of our kind. This is so irrespective of whether, essentially, we are beings with minds or beings of a certain biological species, the human one. Second, it is contended that, even if genetic therapy were to affect our identity, there could be person-regarding reasons for conducting it, for existence can be better than non-existence for the individual.

Topics: Beginning of Human Life; Embryo, Mammalian; Embryonic and Fetal Development; Ethics; Genetic Engineering; Genetic Therapy; Humans; Individuality; Life; Pedigree; Personhood; Philosophy; Psychology; Quality of Life; Risk; Risk Assessment; Twinning, Monozygotic; Twins; Value of Life; Wounds and Injuries

Topics: Abortion, Induced; Attitude; Beginning of Human Life; Contraception; Cultural Diversity; Death; Embryonic and Fetal Development; Ethical Analysis; Ethics; Fetal Viability; Fetus; Government Regulation; History, 20th Century; Homicide; Human Rights; Humans; Individuality; Infanticide; Intention; Life; Maternal-Fetal Relations; Moral Obligations; Motivation; Personhood; Philosophy; Pregnancy; Pregnant Women; Privacy; Public Policy; Rape; Religion; Reproduction; Risk; Risk Assessment; Self Concept; Social Control, Formal; Social Responsibility; Social Values; Value of Life; Wounds and Injuries

Mapping the human genome is an immense project with numerous objectives. Indeed, it is likely that some of its most important ramifications and applications remain as yet unglimpsed. All we can presently attempt is to focus on some of the more obvious possibilities and prepare for the problems already looming on our horizon. One such possibility is that of Prenatal Genetic Intervention (PGI), which might be said to be a therapeutic intervention on behalf of the embryonic child. In this paper, I argue that "genetic therapy" is likely to be a misnomer, and that if PGI becomes possible, we should generally resist its inclusion under the special moral duty of providing health care. "Therapy" necessarily means helping a person, while PGI -- though effecting improvements from an impersonal perspective -- will frequently not consist in directly helping any person. This is due not to the embryo not being a person, but rather to the basic philosophical problem of personal identity persisting through significant alterations -- especially the alteration of genotype. The decisive moral question then hinges on the definition of "significant" alteration. I shall examine the feasibility of drawing analogies from criteria for personal identity proposed in discussions of how persons maintain their identity across time and through physical and psychological change. Certain metaphysical aspects of human identity and individuality will be also touched upon, partly in terms derived from classical Judaism. In conclusion I argue that, regarding embryos in particular, persistence of genotype must generally be deemed a necessary condition for maintaining personal identity. Therefore, many proposals for PGI should be excluded from the notion of therapeutic intervention and thus denied the special moral status of requests for therapy.

Topics: Beginning of Human Life; Embryo, Mammalian; Eugenics; Fetal Diseases; Fetus; Genetic Diseases, Inborn; Genetic Therapy; Germ Cells; Human Genome Project; Humans; Individuality; Judaism; Life; Moral Obligations; Parents; Pedigree; Personhood; Philosophy; Quality of Life; Religion; Risk; Risk Assessment; Self Concept; Social Responsibility; Theology; Value of Life; Wounds and Injuries; Wrongful Life

... We must attempt to explain, how, if ever, our existence may harm us. To address this and the other questions raised, I propose to examine what constitutes harm and whether it makes sense to say that our genetic makeup may harm us. To do this I will describe three approaches to the problem of describing the status of negative effects our genes have upon us, which I have named the "technical harm" view, the "constitutive" view, and the "harmful conditions" view. On the technical harm view, the standard definitions of harm are applied to genetic disposition in an attempt to couch genetic defects or flaws in terms of harming. The constitutive view rejects applying the concept of harm to genetic disposition on the grounds that it is impossible to separate genetic disposition from individual identity. Lastly, the harmful conditions view, which I conclude is the most successful of the three, focuses on the tendency of certain genetic dispositions to cause harm in the future and thus avoids what I will argue are the "context" shortcomings of the other two approaches. To conclude the discussion I will very briefly analyze the ramifications of a harmful conditions view for the concept of genetic disease and the prospects for genetic counseling, gene therapy, and reproductive decision making.

Topics: Altruism; Beginning of Human Life; Beneficence; Eugenics; Fetal Diseases; Fetus; Genetic Diseases, Inborn; Genetic Therapy; Genetics; Goals; Health; Human Rights; Humans; Individuality; Infant, Newborn; Life; Moral Obligations; Pedigree; Personhood; Philosophy; Quality of Life; Risk; Risk Assessment; Self Concept; Social Responsibility; Terminology as Topic; Value of Life; Wounds and Injuries; Wrongful Life

Several important issues are raised and illuminated in "Genetic Harm"; not least, in its detailed discussion of specific genetic disorders. In particular, it focuses on a type of disorder whose ill effects are not manifested at birth, but only at a later stage in life. The conclusion, with its significant implications for practice, seems quite valid: a moral duty should be recognized to genetically (or otherwise, if feasible) cure an embryo of that which is expected to (later) cause such prospective suffering. Yet the reasons given for that conclusion, as well as much of the argument throughout, concentrate on a debatable notion of "harm". On an alternate account -- drawn in terms of personal identity -- what makes the moral difference in this type of case is rather that the genotype manifests itself, and that a life-history begins, prior to (and thus independently of) any effects of the gene(s) we are called to alter.

Topics: Altruism; Beginning of Human Life; Beneficence; Embryo, Mammalian; Fetal Diseases; Fetus; Genetic Diseases, Inborn; Genetic Therapy; Humans; Individuality; Life; Moral Obligations; Pedigree; Personhood; Risk; Risk Assessment; Social Responsibility; Wounds and Injuries

In his paper on the effects of Prenatal Genetic Intervention (PGI) on personal identity, Noam Zohar comes to a conclusion about genetic makeup and the uses of gene therapy quite different from the one I reach in another piece in this issue. Zohar's argument rests on the contention that personal identity changes with alteration of the genome, following what I have identified as the "constitutive" view. To see that this is the pillar supporting the weight of his argument, consider the following. Questions of identity aside, how can it be that altering the genome of children suffering from Lesch-Nyhan syndrome or Tay-Sachs disease so that they now produce the enzyme that they formerly lacked does not benefit them? Clearly, if their identities were not changed, such individuals would in fact realize great benefit from PGI, since the devastating bad effects of the genetic flaw would be avoided. Such a change would certainly make the altered individuals better off, that is, it would benefit them. On this, Zohar and I do not disagree. Persistence of identity through such genetic change is the sticking point.

Topics: Altruism; Beginning of Human Life; Beneficence; Embryo, Mammalian; Eugenics; Fetal Diseases; Fetus; Genetic Diseases, Inborn; Genetic Therapy; Genetics; Germ Cells; Humans; Individuality; Life; Pedigree; Personhood; Risk; Risk Assessment; Wounds and Injuries

Kimberly Hardy was charged after childbirth with child abuse and delivery of cocaine to her fetus through the umbilical cord. Hardy had admitted to police that she had smoked crack cocaine less than 13 hours before giving birth. A doctor testified that the cocaine would have still been passing through the umbilical cord after the infant's birth and before the cord was cut, in other words, after the child became a legal person. A Michigan circuit court had thrown out the child abuse charge on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant's ingestion of cocaine had caused serious physical harm to the child. The Michigan Court of Appeals also decided to throw out the charge, saying that such an application of the cocaine delivery statute would be "so tenuous that we cannot reasonably infer that the legislature intended this application."

Topics: Beginning of Human Life; Child Abuse; Criminal Law; Fetus; Humans; Individuality; Infant, Newborn; Infant, Premature; Jurisprudence; Labor, Obstetric; Liability, Legal; Life; Michigan; Personhood; Pregnancy; Pregnant Women; Prenatal Exposure Delayed Effects; Substance-Related Disorders; Wounds and Injuries

In this paper, the focus is not on some particular developmental feature of the human embryo, but rather on the embryo's potential for development tout court. To this end, the moral relevance of the difference between human embryos that have the potential for continued human growth and development and human embryos that do not have this potential is explored and a distinction between viable and non-viable IVF human embryos is introduced. This is followed by a discussion of what is morally wrong with killing to show that none of the concerns associated with the act of killing apply to the destruction of non-viable IVF human embryos. On this basis, it is argued that scientifically and ethically sound research on spare non-viable IVF human embryos may proceed.

Topics: Abortion, Eugenic; Beginning of Human Life; Biomedical Technology; Congenital, Hereditary, and Neonatal Diseases and Abnormalities; Ectogenesis; Embryo Research; Embryo, Mammalian; Embryonic and Fetal Development; Ethical Analysis; Ethics; Evaluation Studies as Topic; Fertilization in Vitro; Fetal Viability; Fetus; Homicide; Humans; Infant, Newborn; Life; Research; Risk; Risk Assessment; Value of Life; Wedge Argument; Wounds and Injuries

Topics: Abortion, Induced; Beginning of Human Life; Contraception; Ethical Analysis; Ethics; Fetus; Homicide; Human Rights; Humans; Individuality; Life; Ovum; Personhood; Philosophy; Spermatozoa; Wounds and Injuries

Topics: Abortion, Induced; Adult; Animal Rights; Animals; Beginning of Human Life; Child; Contraception; Ethical Analysis; Ethics; Euthanasia; Euthanasia, Active; Fetus; Homicide; Human Characteristics; Human Rights; Humans; Individuality; Infant; Infanticide; Life; Moral Obligations; Morals; Personhood; Philosophy; Self Concept; Social Responsibility; Stress, Psychological; Value of Life; Wounds and Injuries

The Epicurean argument that death cannot be a misfortune for the person who dies because, when death occurs, there is no longer a person to whom any misfortune can befall, fails to establish the conclusions which its defenders have sought from it. Beginning with the premise that death can be bad, either for the victim or in quasi-impersonal terms, the author seeks to define that badness through philosophical analysis. The belief that to have more life than is worth living is always better than to have less is reconciled with the notion that the badness of death increases with the degree of psychological connectedness, using the examples of the deaths of an unborn fetus and of a 35-year-old woman. The author contends it can be better for a person to suffer a worse death at 35 than never to have lived at all.

Topics: Adult; Age Factors; Beginning of Human Life; Congenital, Hereditary, and Neonatal Diseases and Abnormalities; Death; Euthanasia, Passive; Fetus; Homicide; Humans; Individuality; Infant, Newborn; Life; Personhood; Philosophy; Pregnancy; Pregnant Women; Stress, Psychological; Suicide; Value of Life; Wounds and Injuries

Topics: Abortion, Induced; Beginning of Human Life; Contraception; Embryonic and Fetal Development; Ethical Analysis; Ethical Theory; Ethics; Fetus; Humans; Individuality; Life; Moral Obligations; Personhood; Philosophy; Reproduction; Risk; Risk Assessment; Social Responsibility; Wounds and Injuries

Warren's book, Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld; 1985), was reviewed by Helen Bequaert Holmes in the January 1987 issue of Bioethics. Here, Warren responds to the review by clarifying some of her moral arguments and continuing to defend the point of view that selecting the sex of children before conception or before birth is not always sexist, socially harmful, or disrespectful of the child as an end in itself.

Topics: Abortion, Eugenic; Animal Rights; Animals; Beginning of Human Life; Embryonic and Fetal Development; Ethics; Eugenics; Female; Fetus; Freedom; Homicide; Human Rights; Humans; Individuality; Infanticide; International Cooperation; Internationality; Life; Men; Moral Obligations; Motivation; Personhood; Pregnancy; Pregnant Women; Prejudice; Public Policy; Reproduction; Risk; Risk Assessment; Sex Determination Analysis; Sex Preselection; Social Change; Social Control, Formal; Social Responsibility; Value of Life; Wedge Argument; Women; Women's Rights; Wounds and Injuries

Topics: Abortion, Induced; Attitude; Beginning of Human Life; Cryopreservation; Embryo Research; Embryo Transfer; Embryo, Mammalian; Embryonic and Fetal Development; Fertilization in Vitro; Fetus; Humans; Jurisprudence; Life; Moral Obligations; Research; Social Responsibility; United States; Value of Life; Wounds and Injuries

The author accepts that the late fetus is essentially a baby, making late abortion the conceptual equivalent of infanticide, but he argues that the absence of mentality in the embryo is such that it cannot be victimized, let alone murdered. He concludes that it is probably impossible to determine objectively the moral status of the fetus as it develops in the middle period between two and seven months.

Topics: Abortion, Induced; Beginning of Human Life; Embryo, Mammalian; Embryonic and Fetal Development; Fetus; Homicide; Human Characteristics; Humans; Individuality; Infant, Newborn; Infanticide; Life; Moral Obligations; Personhood; Philosophy; Self Concept; Social Responsibility; Stress, Psychological; Value of Life; Wounds and Injuries

Topics: Beginning of Human Life; Compensation and Redress; Economics; Fetal Viability; Fetus; Homicide; Humans; Individuality; Jurisprudence; Liability, Legal; Life; Malpractice; Personhood; Pregnancy; Pregnant Women; Prenatal Exposure Delayed Effects; Stress, Psychological; Wounds and Injuries

Topics: Aborted Fetus; Abortion, Induced; Beginning of Human Life; Criminal Law; Fetal Viability; Fetus; Homicide; Humans; Individuality; Infant, Newborn; Infanticide; Jurisprudence; Legislation as Topic; Life; Louisiana; Personhood; Pregnancy; Pregnant Women; Prenatal Exposure Delayed Effects; State Government; Supreme Court Decisions; Wounds and Injuries

Topics: Accidents; Humans; Life; Universities; Wounds and Injuries

Topics: Humans; Lactic Acid; Lactobacillus; Life; Psychotherapy; Wound Infection; Wounds and Injuries